We use the Hsiao-Granger method to test for growth-terrorism causality for seven Western European countries. In bivariate settings, the impact of economic performance on domestic terrorism is very strong. In trivariate settings, the impact of performance on terrorism diminishes. Here, we …nd that economic performance leads terrorist violence in robust ways only for three out of seven countries. Terrorism is almost never found to causally in ‡uence growth in bivariate and trivariate speci…cations. Our …ndings indicate that (i) the role of economic performance in determining terrorist violence appears to have been important for some countries and (ii) all attacked economies have been successful in adjusting to the threat of terrorism.
INTRODUCTION
The question of causality between terrorism and economic performance has not been settled. Does terrorism produce noticeable damages to aggregate performance, does poor economic performance contribute to the generation of terror, or do both e¤ects exist side by side? On the one hand, the allocation and accumulation of resources may be negatively in ‡uenced by terrorism, for instance, as investment or savings are discouraged, consequently also a¤ecting economic growth. On the other hand, economic factors may play an important role in explaining terrorism, for example, as low opportunity costs of violence -manifested in poor economic growth -may foster con ‡ict.
This contribution aims to identify the links between the intensity of domestic terrorism and the rate of real GDP per capita growth. 1 We investigate this relationship for seven Western European countries. 2 All investigated countries experienced substantial economic success in the past. Most countries grew between 2 and 4% p.a. between 1950 and 2004. Nevertheless, these countries also su¤ered episodes of major political violence, especially in comparison to other countries in this part of the world. In fact, the seven selected countries accounted for 97% of all reported terrorist attacks and 96% of all reported terror-related fatalities from 1950 to 2004, according to the Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) dataset of Engene (2007) . 3 Most domestic terrorist organizations in the investigated countries were driven by leftist, ethnic-nationalist or separatist ideologies (cf. Engene, 2007) . Thus, they were potentially motivated by political factors. However, terrorism cannot be sensibly explained by one 'root cause'only. With our analysis, we want to …nd out whether economic performance -economic growth -also swayed the terrorists' calculus. At the same time, we want to analyze whether terrorism negatively a¤ected growth. We test for growth-terrorism Granger causality in a time-series framework. We try to detect causality only in a statistical but not purely philosophical -'cause and e¤ect'-sense. That is, through our analysis we are able to assess whether changes in terrorism (growth) are helpful for forecasting future changes in growth (terrorism). Our analysis is helpful in approximating 'real' causality without implying it, so corresponding interpretations should be made carefully. In order to investigate for Granger causality in our empirical framework, we …rst examine the stationarity properties of the underlying time series through a unit root test. At this point we are also able to identify structural breaks, that is, major changes in the country's economic or political history during the period of observation. We then process our data in accordance with the unit root test results. When we test for Granger causality, we rely on the Hsiao-Granger procedure to circumvent common problems associated with detecting Granger causality in time-series frameworks. In comparison to standard Granger causality tests, our procedure allows for high variations in lag length selection. In order to avoid omitted variable biases and to check for robustness, we test for causality in a bivariate and trivariate system. By testing for Granger causality in a time-series setting, we add to existing evidence which has mainly blanked out the question of causality between economic performance and terrorist violence. As our main results, we …nd that (i) all the investigated growth and terror series exhibit structural breaks that match with important turning points in the countries'economic and political history. (ii) In bivariate systems, economic growth leads terrorist violence in all cases, whereas terrorism causally in ‡uences growth only in the case of Portugal. It appears as if economic performance in ‡uences the terrorists'calculus, yet the resiliency of attacked economies is generally high, so terror-induced shocks do not feed through to growth. (iii) Knowing that bivariate causality tests are prone to inconsistencies, we also perform causality tests in trivariate systems. The …ndings con…rm that economies under attack are successful in adjusting to the threats of terror, so growth is not impaired. With respect to Granger causality running from growth to terrorism, the results weaken previous ones from the bivariate analysis. Economic performance robustly sways the terrorists'calculus only for Germany, Portugal and Spain, but not for the rest of the sample. That is, in some countries solid growth may raise the opportunity costs of terror, thus discouraging violent behavior, for instance as individuals …nd more economic opportunities; the opposite relationship should hold in periods of economic downturn. Policymakers should not underestimate the role of economic factors -and of the opportunity costs of violence -in impacting domestic terrorism. For some countries in Western Europe, economic success apparently contributed to a crowding out of domestic terrorism. However, factors other than economic performance -for instance political instability, demographic pressures or international politics -should also be considered when explaining terrorism dynamics, in particular when growth-terrorism links are not found to be strong.
The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the academic literature on possible interactions between terrorism and growth. In Section 3, we introduce the data and our methodology, and also present our empirical results. In Section 4, we discuss our …ndings. We sum up our results in Section 5.
CAUSAL LINKS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND GROWTH Potential Impact of Terrorism on Economic Growth
A central short-run goal of terrorists is economic destabilization. Terrorist actions -assassinations, bombings, and so forth -are means to achieve this shortrun goal. Long-run political objectives -such as a redistribution of wealth and power -are to be enforced through such actions. Collier (1999) identi…es several channels through which civil war a¤ects the economy; Collier's ideas may be transferred to terrorism as another form of violent con ‡ict. The channels of transaction from con ‡ict to the economy are: destruction, disruption, diversion, dissaving and portfolio substitution. 4 Destruction refers to the direct costs of terrorism, as human and physical capital are destroyed through terrorist strikes. The disruption e¤ect may for instance become manifest in higher transaction costs, as the e¤ectiveness of public institutions is challenged and manipulated by terror, as insecurity in general increases, and so forth. Diversion occurs when public resources are shifted from output-enhancing to non-productive -defence and security -expenditures. Dissaving refers to a decline in savings that a¤ects the economy's capital stock. Portfolio substitution means the ‡ight of human, physical and …nancial capital from a country in the face of con ‡ict. Through all these e¤ects economic performance may su¤er, in particular as they may reinforce each other. Inter alia, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) , Naor (2006) and Mirza and Verdier (2008) provide related theoretical considerations that also discuss how terror may act negatively on economic activity. In general, terrorism may distort the allocation of resources, basically through the disruption, diversion and portfolio substitution channel. It may also negatively in ‡uence resource accumulation, mainly via the destruction and dissaving channel. Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008) . In general, existing evidence con…rms that terrorists are able to destabilize targeted economies. Here, economic activity is a¤ected through various channels, for instance through the destruction of national capital stocks, the disruption of trade or tourism ‡ows, or the diversion of resources away from private investment, ultimately resulting in negative growth e¤ects.
Possible E¤ects of Economic Performance on Terrorism
Economic theory argues that terrorists are rational individuals which choose their levels of violent activity according to the costs and bene…ts arising from their actions (cf., e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2004) . Because of terrorists' presumed rationality, the opportunity costs of terror also matter. Intuitively, low opportunity costs of violence -that is, few prospects of economic activity -lead to elevated terrorist activity, whereas high opportunity costs result in the opposite (cf., e.g., Freytag et al., 2008) . Times of economic success mean, inter alia, more individual economic opportunities and economic participation. Higher levels of overall growth should coincide with higher opportunity costs of terror and thus less violence. Conversely, in periods of economic downturn should be accompanied by fewer economic opportunities and participation and thus by more economic dissatisfaction. In times of economic crisis, dissidents are more likely to resort to violence as the opportunity costs of terror are low, while the potential long-run payo¤s from violence -a redistribution of scarce economic resources which is to be enforced by means of terrorism -are comparatively high (cf. Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004).
To some extent, empirical evidence suggests that economic performance and terrorism are linked along the lines discussed before. The …ndings of Collier and Hoe-er (1998) indicate that higher levels of economic development coincide with lower likelihoods of civil war, providing initial evidence that economic success and con ‡ict are diametrically opposed. Considering economic development and terrorism, several studies …nd that higher levels of development are obstacles to the production of transnational terrorism (cf., e.g., Santos Bravo 6 In general, the evidence indicates that terrorism and economic conditions are linked. Here, economic success seems to impede the genesis of terrorism, presumably due to higher opportunity costs of con ‡ict. In other words, in times of stronger economic performance individuals simply have more to lose.
Research Contribution and Focus
Feasible theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence have been brought forward considering the e¤ects of terrorism on growth and of growth on terrorism. Still, to the best of our knowledge no study has analyzed the causal nature of the growth-terrorism nexus. Also, due to data constraints past evidence has focused almost exclusively on transnational terrorism, although domestic terrorism is a far more common phenomenon (cf. Enders and Sandler, 2008) . With this contribution we want to add to existing empirical evidence by providing a time-series analysis of Granger causality between domestic terrorism and economic growth. Here, multiple directions of causality are plausible. (i) Economic performance may granger-cause terrorism, or (ii) terrorism may granger-cause performance. On the one hand, terrorism a¤ects the allocation and accumulation of resources. On the other hand, economic performance may also impact the opportunity costs of terror. (iii) If the two processes exist simultaneously, then feedback between them is detected. Such a relationship may hint at the existence of a vicious circle of con ‡ict and economic decline, as previously discussed by Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006). Lastly, (iv) a causal relationship between performance and terror in the statistical sense may also be non-existent when there is no evidence of substantial links. In the next section, we test for Granger causality between domestic terrorism and economic performance. As we are well aware that economic growth and domestic terrorism may also be determined by other factors, we test for causality in trivariate time-series settings which include a related control variable. 7 As a control, we choose trade openness, as this variable may interact with growth as well as with terrorism. On the one hand, trade may impact growth, for instance by inducing specialization and technology di¤usion; increases in trade openness may translate into higher economic growth (cf. Harrison, 1996) . On the other hand, trade may for instance be regarded as a threat by 'globalization losers'when jobs are lost, or as an opportunity by 'globalization winners'when trade increases wealth. Depending on which mechanism dominates, terrorism may increase or decrease with rising trade openness as the opportunity costs of violence are a¤ected. 8 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Data
We extract data on growth and terrorism for seven Western European countries. Economic growth is measured by the rate of real GDP per capita growth in 2000 constant prices. Data for growth comes from the PENN World Table of Heston, Summers and Aten (2006). Domestic terrorism is indicated by the total number of individuals killed and wounded by acts of domestic terrorism in a given year and country. That is, we use raw data on terrorist victims -on the intensity of terror -rather than on terrorist attacks. 9 We transform the series by taking the natural logarithm and adding unity to allow for zero observations. 10 Data on domestic terrorism comes from the TWEED dataset as described by Engene (2007) . We also test for growth-terrorism causality in a trivariate setting, using trade openness as a control variable to reduce potential problems due to omitted variables. Trade openness is measured as the logarithm of the sum of exports and imports divided by real GDP in 2000 constant prices. Data for openness also comes from the PENN World Table. Econometric Procedure Below, we want to investigate the causal linkages between domestic terrorism and economic growth. Methodologically, we proceed as follows. (i) We conduct unit root tests to identify the order of integration of the investigated time series, and to check for potential breaks in the series. (ii) As we need de-trended I(0) time series to carry out the Granger causality analyses properly we then process the data accordingly, building on unit root test results. (iii) We employ this processed data when we execute a number of causality tests using the HsiaoGranger method. First, we test for causality in bivariate settings, where we only consider the growth and terrorism series. Then, we also test for Granger causality in a trivariate scenario to broaden the evidence and to evaluate the robustness of our bivariate causality test results.
Unit Root Test
We …rst have to identify the order of integration of the investigated series. To ensure a correct application of the causality test, all series need to be I(0), that is, stationary and not exhibiting a unit root. The series cover long time spans. Therefore, they may exhibit unexpected shifts -structural breaks -that are a consequence of e.g. major structural changes in the economic or political realm. Conventional unit root tests do not account for structural breaks and therefore may produce biased results. In order to account for possible breaks in the data, we use the unit root test (ZA test) of Zivot and Andrews (1992) which allows for a structural break. Through this test the investigated series are identi…ed as I(1) -di¤erence-stationary -or I(0) with a break in the deterministic trend, that is, trend-stationary. We use model C of the ZA test which allows for a break to occur in both intercept and 6 trend. The test also gives the dates of the endogenously determined structural breaks, thus further unveiling underlying dynamics.
11 Table 1 gives the results of the ZA test for all investigated series. For growth and terrorism, the unit root test always indicates that the series are I(0) with a trend. For trade openness, the series are identi…ed to be I(1) in six out of seven cases. The calculated break dates …t in very well with economic and political history. For instance, for Portugal, Spain and Greece most break dates coincide with their transition to democracy. For the United Kingdom, the structural break for the terror series matches the beginning of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. For France, the break date for the economic growth series coincides with the end of the Thirty Glorious Years of steady economic development. For the other countries, similar observations can be made.
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Processing of Time-Series Data
Based on the results of the ZA test, we now process the time-series data in order to obtain I(0) series. For six out of seven series on trade openness, the ZA test indicates the existence of a unit root. Here, we achieve stationarity by simply taking …rst di¤erences.
When the ZA test does not indicate a unit root, the series is I(0) with a trend. This is the case for one openness series and all growth and terror series. If so, utilizing a di¤erence …lter to obtain stationarity is neither necessary nor useful. Instead, we de-trend the data following the method proposed by, inter alia, Fernandez (1997) . We run an OLS regression of the following form:
y t is the dependent variable representing the respective series for growth, terror or openness. is a constant, t is a time trend, and DU t , D t and DT t take values depending on the calculated break date T B : DU t = 1 for t < T B , 0 otherwise; D t = 1 for t = T B , 0 otherwise; DT t = (t T B ) for t > T B , 0 otherwise.ŷ t is the residual from the OLS estimation. By using this approach, we are able to eliminate trends and to take into account underlying structural changes which may otherwise lead to biased results. We obtain the residuals of the respective estimations,ŷ t , and use these de-trended residual data in the subsequent causality analyses.
Hsiao-Granger Causality Test Bivariate Causality Test
Tests for Granger causality are important tools in time-series analyses, for instance as employed in Kollias, Naxakis and Zarangas (2004). A potential shortcoming of standard Granger causality analyses is that they may su¤er from arbitrary lag length selection because the considered time-series variables are constrained to all enter at the same lag length. This may yield inconsistent results due to model misspeci…cations (cf. Braun and Mittnik, 1993) . We hence rely on the sequential approach of Hsiao (1979 Hsiao ( , 1982 to test for Granger causality, which in particular circumvents problems associated with lag length selection. This procedure has been applied in e.g. Hsiao (1979 Hsiao ( , 1982 
In its basic form, the causality testing procedure requires us to …rst consider an autoregressive process:
In Equation (2), the sigma sign in front of the lag operator (L) indicates the lag order of the series running from 1 to m. u t is a white noise term with the usual statistical properties and is a constant term. y t is operationalized depending on the previous ZA tests. If the series is I(0) with a trend, we employ the residuals obtained from Equation (1),ŷ t . If the series is I(1), we use the usual di¤erence …lter where y t is equal to y t 1 y t in order to obtain stationarity. We choose the lag order that yields the smallest FPE, denoted F P E y (m ; 0). The individual FPE are calculated from the following equation with lags varying from 1 to m:
Here, T is the number of observations and SSE is the residual sum of squares. Then, we allow another variable x t to enter our model, so we receive the subsequent vector autoregression model (VAR):
u t and v t are white noise terms with the usual statistical properties, and is a constant. The sigma sign in front of the lag operator (L) indicates the lag order of the series, where y t and x t again take values based on the previous ZA tests. Either they represent the residuals obtained from Equation (1), or they are di¤erence-stationary series where the usual di¤erence-…lter has been employed. Note that in both cases the series are now I(0), so the causality testing procedure can be conducted properly. While y t steadily enters Equation (4) with the lag order from Equation (3) that yields the smallest FPE, m , x t enters with a sequence of lags varying from 1 to n. The FPE of Equation (4) are computed, with the speci…c lag order being chosen that generates the smallest FPE, denoted as F P E y (m ; n ), from:
By comparing the two minimal FPE, we can draw conclusions regarding causality. If F P E y (m ; 0) > F P E y (m ; n ), then x t ) y t , thus Granger causality is established. If F P E y (m ; 0) < F P E y (m ; n ), then x t 6 ) y t and no Granger causality is detected. Testing for Granger causality running from y t to x t requires us to repeat the previously described steps this time with x t being the dependent variable, so we ultimately arrive at Equation (5).
Trivariate Causality Test
It is a well-known fact that causality tests in bivariate settings may produce inconsistent results. Lütkepohl (1982) shows that whether or not Granger causality is detected in a bivariate speci…cation may be due to omitted variables. In order to reduce the possibility of omitted variables, we transform our bivariate model into a trivariate one by including a control variable. Methodologically, we build on the previously discussed procedure. We are now interested in the causal relationship between the series y t and z t . Therefore, we …rst consider an autoregressive process as in Equation (2) and determine the accordant minimal FPE as in Equation (3). Then, we consider a bivariate VAR as in Equation (4), where the added variable x t now is the control variable, namely trade openness. We calculate the minimal FPE as in Equation (5). Next, we consider a trivariate VAR, where a new variable z t enters with lags varying from 1 to p, while y t and x t enter the model with the lag order that yields the smallest FPE, m and n . 13 The corresponding FPE is computed, with the speci…c lag order being chosen that generates the smallest FPE, denoted as F P E y (m ; n ; p ), from the following equation with the known notation:
F P E y (m ; n ; p) = (T + m + n + p + 1) (T m n p 1)
By comparing the two minimal FPE from the bivariate and trivariate VAR, we can draw conclusions on causality. If F P E y (m ; n ; 0) > F P E y (m ; n ; p ), then z t ) y t ; Granger causality is established, conditional upon the presence of x t . If F P E y (m ; n ; 0) < F P E y (m ; n ; p ), then z t 6 ) y t and no Granger causality is detected. In order to test for causality from z t to x t , we would have to repeat the procedure the other way around. Table 2 gives the results of the bivariate tests for causality running from terrorism to real GDP per capita growth. Our results indicate that terrorism causally sways economic growth only in the case of Portugal. For all other countries, we do not detect a causal link. We may therefore assume that strong and developed economies are able to endure terrorist violence without su¤ering major negative growth e¤ects. Rather, they seem to be able to absorb risk associated with domestic terrorism. This is in line with Enders and Sandler (2008) who also argue that economies that are, inter alia, diversi…ed and exhibit well-developed institutions are generally able to withstand the adverse macroeconomic e¤ects of terrorism.
Bivariate Causality Test Results
In Table 2 , we report our …ndings on causality running from growth to terrorism. Here, economic growth always exerts a causal in ‡uence on terrorist violence. That is, we can assume that economic growth a¤ects the terrorists'calculus by having an impact on the opportunity costs of violence. Economic success allows for more economic participation and opportunities, thus making violence more costly. The contrary should hold for times of economic decline.
In general, for our sample we do not …nd strong support that economic growth is a¤ected by violence. Rather, targeted economies appear to be stable enough to withstand the threat of domestic terrorism without su¤ering major economic setbacks. 14 We …nd that growth unidirectionally causes domestic terrorist violence for six out of seven countries. For Portugal we …nd bidirectional Granger causality. In the bivariate model speci…cation, a strong link runs from economic growth to terrorist violence, presumably as the opportunity costs of political violence are impacted. This matches with previous empirical …ndings which attribute a strong role to economic factors in shaping the patterns of con ‡ict and terrorist violence (cf., e. - Table 2 here -
Trivariate Causality Test Results
We have already argued that care should be taken interpreting bivariate causality test results due to the possibility of misleading results. Table 2 has given an initial hint that such caution could be appropriate for our analysis. The reported joint F-statistics are not always signi…cant, indicating that our causality inferences may be spurious. To reduce potential bias due to omitted variables and to raise the explanatory power of our analysis, we also test for Granger causality between domestic terrorism and economic growth, conditional upon the presence of trade openness. Earlier, we already outlined the underlying mechanisms. On the one hand, trade may in ‡uence growth via increased specialization and so forth. On the other hand, trade may also in ‡uence terrorist activity, mainly by a¤ecting the opportunity costs of violence. That is, from a theoretical point of view there is the possibility that trade openness may drive growth as well as terrorism. By accounting for trade openness in a trivariate system, we are able to reduce inconsistent causality inferences which may have resulted from the omission of trade openness in a bivariate model. Table 3 gives the results of the trivariate Granger causality tests running from terrorism to real GDP per capita growth. The link from terrorism to growth found in the bivariate system for Portugal is not detected in the trivariate case. Concerning Germany and Spain, we interpret our results as in Triacca (1998) , also concluding that there is no causal relationship from terrorism to growth for these countries. In the bivariate system, we have already detected that there is no Granger causality running from terrorist violence to economic growth; in the trivariate system, the comparison between the two FPE now only seems to suggest a causal e¤ect from terror to growth. Following Triacca (1998), we argue that it is actually trade openness -the omitted variable in the bivariate system -that causes growth, and not terrorism. 16 We therefore cannot state that for Germany and Spain Granger causality runs from terrorist violence to growth. To sum up, when including information on trade openness in a higher dimensional process, we are hence unable to discover any statistical causality e¤ect of terrorism on economic growth. This con…rms our earlier interpretation that attacked economies have been successful in coping with the threats of domestic terrorism. We attribute this resilience to the strength of the markets and institutions of attacked economies (cf. Enders and Sandler, 2008) . With respect to the link from economic growth to terrorism, the results displayed in Table 3 show that economic growth granger-causes terrorism now only in the cases of Germany, Portugal and Spain. Note that for these cases the joint F-statistics now always indicate signi…cance, adding to the reliability of the causality inferences. For France, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom we cannot con…rm our causality …ndings from the bivariate speci…cation. That is, we still …nd some evidence for the idea that terrorism is impacted by growth through the latter's e¤ect on the opportunity costs of violence. Conditional upon the presence of information on trade openness, the in ‡uence of economic performance on terrorism generally becomes less pronounced. Bivariate Granger causality tests have at times been known to deliver inconsistent results; these …ndings should therefore be considered with caution. In general, the Granger causality test results of the trivariate case only partially con…rm those of the bivariate analysis. On the one hand, the additional evidence supports our idea that attacked economies have been successful in adjusting to terrorist violence, thereby not incurring costs in the form of reduced growth. We do not detect any Granger causality running from terrorism to growth in trivariate systems. On the other hand, we should probably not overestimate the determining e¤ect of economic performance on terrorism, as we see related causal relationships only for Germany, Portugal and Spain. This supports the evidence provided by, inter alia, Freytag et al. (2008) on the e¤ect of income growth on terrorism. Still, the missing links for the other four countries of our sample also support views that are more skeptical of the impact of economic performance on terrorism (cf., e.g., Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen and Klemmensen 2006).
- Table 3 here -
DISCUSSION Policy Implications
The results of our Hsiao-Granger causality analysis indicate that economic factors -at least in some countries -played an important role in shaping terrorist violence in Western Europe after the Second World War. In general, we provide support for policies that aim at increasing the opportunity costs of terror as, for instance, advocated by Frey and Luechinger (2003) . Apparently economic success -especially in Germany, Portugal and Spain -helped to reduce political violence by raising the opportunity costs of terrorism. Policies that focus on growth and economic development are thus also potentially helpful in scaling down terror risks. Related policies may yield additional dividends beyond raising economic status, as social stability and peace may also be a¤ected. For Western Europe, developed welfare states may provide important institutional channels for disseminating economic success, likewise explaining a link from economic performance to domestic terrorism. 17 Our results also imply that domestic terrorist violence did not a¤ect GDP per capita growth. A¤ected economies seem to have been generally successful in dealing with terror risks. Markets and institutions appear to have adjusted e¤ectively to terror risks. In general, we argue that (i) policies that aim at improving economic status should also be pursued because they may robustly reduce the propensity towards domestic terrorism at least in some countries. The opportunity costs of violence and the general in ‡uence of economic factors on terror should not be disregarded.
(ii) Policies that aim to increase the e¢ ciency of markets and institutions should also be undertaken because they help to protect economies from the negative e¤ects of terrorism by increasing markets and institutions'resiliency to terrorist attacks.
Caveats
Several caveats can be brought forward with respect to our analysis. (i) Our evidence is region-speci…c, so the results may not hold for other world regions. These regions may exhibit less developed markets and institutions, so they are more prone to terror-induced shocks. Additionally, the relationship between economic factors and terrorism may be less pronounced. For instance, the studies of Feldmann and Perälä (2004) for Latin America or of Piazza (2007) for the Middle East suggest that other factors -for instance, political instability or state failure -matter more strongly to terrorism in these parts of the world. (ii) We only look at domestic terrorism. On the one hand, domestic terrorism is a more common phenomenon than transnational terrorism, so we should be able to thoroughly assess the interaction between terrorism and economic performance with our data. On the other hand, transnational terrorism may also contribute to this interaction, potentially amplifying the e¤ects indicated by our analysis. 18 (iii) With respect to our policy advice, we acknowledge that terrorism is caused not only by economic factors. Economic success is not a panacea for terror. For instance, political participation may also be helpful as it in ‡uences the opportunity costs of violence as well (cf. Frey and Luechinger, 2003) . In particular, this is true for con ‡ict that is also obviously co-determined by political factors as e.g. in the case of ETA (cf. Barros, 2003) .
SUMMARY
In this contribution, we tested for Granger causality between domestic terrorism and real GDP per capita growth. Using the Hsiao-Granger method to detect causality in time series, we were able to circumvent common problems associated with causality analyses in time-series frameworks. We tested for causality in a bivariate and trivariate setting in order to provide robust results. We found that (i) all investigated growth and terror series exhibit structural breaks matching major turning points in the countries' economic and political history. (ii) In bivariate systems, economic growth leads terrorist violence in all cases, whereas terrorism causally in ‡uences growth only for one country. We argued that economic performance appears to in ‡uence the terrorists'calculus, while attacked economies are generally resistant to domestic terrorism. (iii) We noted that bivariate causality tests may be prone to inconsistencies, so we also performed causality tests in trivariate systems. The …ndings con…rmed that economies under attack are successful in adjusting to the threats of terror, so economic growth is not impaired. With respect to causality running from growth to terrorism, the results weaken those of the bivariate analysis. Economic performance robustly sways the terrorists'calculus only for Germany, Portugal and Spain, but not for France, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. Solid growth in some countries may raise the opportunity costs of terror, thus discouraging violent behavior, for instance as individuals …nd more economic opportunities. In the light of our results, policymakers therefore should not underestimate the role of economic factors -and the role of the opportunity costs of violence -in impacting domestic terrorism. For some countries in the investigated part of the world, economic success apparently has contributed to a crowding out of domestic terrorist violence. However, factors other than economic performance should also be considered when explaining terrorism dynamics, in particular when the links between economic growth and domestic terrorist violence are not found to be strong.
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Notes 1 For our analysis we focus on domestic terrorism, that is, terrorism involving only citizens, groups or the territory of one country. In contrast, transnational terrorism means terrorism involving citizens, groups or the territory of more than one country. Here, either the sources or targets of transnational terrorism can be analyzed. 2 The countries of the analysis with their time horizons are: France , Germany (1971 Germany ( -2004 , Greece (1952 Greece ( -2004 , Italy (1951 Italy ( -2004 , Portugal (1951 Portugal ( -2004 , Spain (1951 Spain ( -2004 and the United Kingdom (1951 Kingdom ( -2004 . No information on Germany is available before 1970; data prior to 1990 relates only to West Germany. The information on the United Kingdom also includes Northern Ireland. 3 The TWEED dataset provides information on domestic terrorism for 18 Western European countries. 4 Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2007) and Enders and Sandler (2008) bring forward similar theoretical channels of in ‡uence of terrorism on the economy. These studies also provide additional evidence on the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism that is not reported here. 5 The empirical evidence reported in the following almost always refers to the phenomenon of transnational terrorism, given the lack of data on domestic terrorism in the past (cf. Enders and Sandler, 2008 ). Although we do not believe that transnational and domestic terrorism interact symmetrically with the economy, we report …tting evidence to show (i) that terrorism may damage the economy and (ii) economic factors may determine terrorist activity. 6 Evidence on the targets of transnational terrorism either …nds that short-run and long-run economic conditions do not matter strongly for terrorists' attack decisions (cf. Piazza Attackers from abroad may not be deterred by increased economic opportunities in the country they attack. Instead, economic success may increase the payo¤s from terrorist strikes. That is, the cost-bene…t considerations of transnational attackers may di¤er from those of domestic terrorists. 7 Economic growth may also be driven by, inter alia, geography, trade or institutions. Terrorism may be determined by e.g. other material causes, political factors, demography or systemic reasons. 8 Mirza and Verdier (2008) provide an overview of the terrorism-trade literature, focusing on transnational terrorism. It is reasonable to believe that at least some related …ndings can be transferred to the relationship between domestic terrorism and trade. Note that in the broader sense trade openness may also re ‡ect the general quality of institutions (cf. Rodrik, 2000) . Better institutional quality should coincide with less terrorist activity. 9 When we use data on terrorist attack counts, we cannot possibly evaluate the ferocity of such attacks. For instance, both a minor, politically motivated damage to property and a severe bombing with multiple casualties count as one attack; here, it appears reasonable to assume that there is a much stronger interaction between the bombing and economic factors. 1 0 We use the natural logarithm to better account for outliers. We add unity to the observations in order to compute the natural logarithm also in those years when there were no victims from terrorist attacks. 1 1 Note that when two or more series used simultaneously in the following causality analysis are found to be I(1), further tests for cointegration would be required in order to account for long-run equilibrium relationships between the series. As cointegration plays no role in our analysis, we do not discuss this point any further. 1 2 We also use the unit root test of Clemente, Montañés and Reyes (1998) which allows for two structural breaks. These results generally con…rm our results on stationarity and structural break dates. 1 3 The trivariate VAR is not presented due to space constraints. 1 4 We are well aware that terrorism may damage certain sectors of the economy, and we hinted at corresponding evidence in our literature review. Our analysis simply provides little evidence that such damages feed through to overall growth. 1 5 One can argue that other factors potentially driving growth as well as terrorism should also be controlled for, such as the quality of economic institutions, political instability and transformation, or human capital endowment. We opt for trade openness because it matches with our analysis on thereotical grounds and because data is available for all countries and time periods. 1 6 Triacca (1998) provides proof for the following argument: If a variable Y 3 does not cause Y 1 in a bivariate system, but in a trivariate one where the variable Y 2 is also included, then Y 2 must cause Y 1 in the bivariate and trivariate system. We apply his proof to our causality evidence for Germany and Spain, where Y 1 is economic growth, Y 2 is trade openness and Y 3 is terrorist violence. 1 7 See Burgoon (2006) for an in-depth discussion of the potential links between terrorism and welfare policies. 1 8 However, clearly di¤erentiating between domestic and transnational terrorism -as in our analysis -may be helpful to keep apart potentially di¤erent terrorists' calculi. As discussed before, transnational terrorists may be driven by other cost-bene…t considerations than domestic terrorists. For instance, while transnational terrorists may …nd it attractive to attack rich countries because of the increased bene…ts of such attacks, domestic terrorists may reduce attacks at the same time due to the increased opportunity costs of violence. ,0) indicates the minimal FPE of autoregressive process with the optimal lag length m . FPE (m,n) indicates the minimal FPE of the two variable VAR process with the optimal lag lengths m and n . We allow for a maximum of six lags. (b) and (a) denote signi…cance of the joint F-statistics at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
20
